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Isabel Karpin 
Much feminist legal scholarship has attempted to critique the legal con-
cept of selfhood for its reliance upon an artifice of physical boundedness 
and unity. Feminists who reject the law's embrace of a self produced 
in response to what Lacan called the "lure of spatial identification" 1 
(Lacan 1977: 5; Meek 1998) do so because the political, social, and 
legal consequences that follow from this ascription of selfhood work 
against the bodies of women. Women's bodies, it is argued, are least 
able to conform to an optics of the skin, particularly in the context 
of pregnancy. Unbounded corporeality is not however, confined to 
women's bodies. Haraway, for instance, points out that in these days 
of biotechnological seeing, "even the most reliable Western individuated 
bodies ... neither stop nor start at the skin, which is itself something of 
a teeming jungle threatening illicit fusions" (Haraway 1991: 215). The 
self is a construct that extends beyond the limits of the physical by sim-
ply being in the world. Its extension in time and space undermines 
the alleged autocracy of the individual. Susan Ballard argues, "every act 
of viewing becomes an event in which the boundaries of our bodies are 
imbricated in relations with other bodies" (Ballard 2001: 1). Similarly, 
Avital Ronell argues that once the telephone enabled the distant projec-
tion of the voice in space, the boundaries that demarcated our bodies 
were fundamentally questioned (Ron ell 1989; see also Ron ell 1994 ). 
In this chapter I want to show how genetic discourses, indifferent to the 
surface of the body as a marker of identity, demand a more complex 
understanding of the self in law. What happens, for instance, when 
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In her discussion of conjoined twins, Margrit Shildrick describes the 
leakiness of self as corporeal ambiguity. She says: " [a ]bove all it is the cor-
poreal ambiguity and fluidity, the troublesome lack of fixed definition, 
the refusal to be either one thing or the other, that marks the monstrous 
as a site of disruption" (Shildrick 1999: 78). I will argue in a related 
approach that biogenetic discourses, which emphasize shared identity 
and participation in the common genetic pool, reveal the monstrousness 
in all of us. This is challenging to law because such discourses expose 
the impossibility of the autonomous, self-sufficient individual of liberal 
legalism. The individual in the age of the gene is fundamentally con-
nected and vulnerable. The individual in the age of the gene always 
contains a trace of the other; not-one but not-two (Karpin 1992). 
I turn to the normative individual of liberal jurisprudence and show 
how even he (and I use the gendered pronoun deliberately) can no longer 
sustain the essential distance and difference between one and another 
(Callais 1987). Allen Meek writes of how Lacan extrapolated from 
Callais's writing to explain that "the autonomous self is produced as 
an optical effect as a body attempts to conform to an encoded visual 
surface and to inhabit a landscape constituted as a field of the other's 
gaze" (Meek 1998: 3) It is this differentiated self, certain of its limits, 
that we are taught to prize. The failure to articulate and determine fixed 
and impenetrable boundaries is a failure of selfhood. The discourse of 
genetics requires us to lose ourselves (or more correctly to find ourselves) 
in a genetic code that imbricates us with the other. In this case we 
recognize a selfhood that is based on interconnection and intermingled 
identity. 
In this chapter I examine both legislative and quasi-legislative attempts 
to restore the visual surface of the body as the marker of individual 
identity. In the case of genetic discourses, the primary means by which 
this has occurred is through privacy legislation. Such legislation aims to 
secure one's right to keep one's genetic identity to oneself. The problem 
is how to identify the rights-bearing individual in the first place. Each 
person's genetic code reveals not only who we are but also who else we 
might become. If we are always implicated in the genetic profiles of 
our relatives, can we hope to keep ourselves private and can it offer us 
any solace to do so? We share our genes with others by decreasing 
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of the individual to a family that is constructed or mapped over a genetic 
pedigree.' This form of individuality, which immediately connects one to 
genetically related others, disables the liberal individual premised on 
a distinct and separate selfhood. Instead, it enables or renders able-bodied 
a transgressive individual whose very selfhood is already connected 
and vulnerable to the embodiment of someone else. I argue that this is 
not the end of individuality or indeed autonomy, but that transgressive 
selfhood demands of us a new understanding of each of these two terms. 
Before I make this argument, however, it is useful to use both Finkler and 
Dolgin's concerns as a stepping-off point. 
Finkler argues that the hegemony of the gene is undermining what she 
describes as the "mark of a modern individual" namely, "autonomy, 
independence and detachment from kinship ties" (Finkler 2001: 237). 
Her focus is on the way that the gene reestablishes kinship as a bio-
genetic connection rather than a relationship established on the basis 
of choice. She states: 
Beyond issues associated with gender, family and kinship ties have been given 
a new dimension that stresses faulty genes rather than social status, position or 
even poverty. Cultural significance is,.given to genetic transmission for better 
or for worse. (Finkler 2001: 239) 
Finkler bases her argument on research she conducted involving several 
adoptees who sought out the identity of their birth parents. Many of 
them were motivated by a need to ascertain their medical histories. 
Others found themselves seeking out genetic relatives because they 
suffered from a genetically inherited form of disease (Finkler 2001):1 
In examining these cases Finkler argues that the geneticization of kinship' 
has given rise to the possibility of a connection between individuals who 
may otherwise be nonintimate relations or strangers. 
Although Finkler never expressly identifies what is wrong or right with 
these new directions, the language that she uses suggests that there arc 
significant benefits in the biogenetic model of kinship. She says: 
It recasts our dispersed and loose kinship ties as inexorable genetic ones and 
reestablishes our continuity with family and kin. Once uprooted we have been 
reunited by the medicalization of family and kinship. Willingly or not, we must 
recognize our connectedness, albeit by our dysfunction and disorderS. DNA joins 
the compartmentalized, fragmented postmodern individual to his or her ances-
tors. (Finkler 2001: 249) 
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autonomy and self-determination (discussed later). The second model 
was developed by the Cancer Genetic Ethics Committee of the Anti 
Cancer Council of Victoria and is a medical and family-centered model 
(Skene 1998; 1-41). In this second model, it is envisaged that genetic 
information (and the tissue that is tested) would be shared among blood 
relatives. Furthermore, individuals would not have the ultimate right 
to "control . _ . their information and the use of the tissue taken for 
genetic testing" (Skene 1998: 24). Instead, ownership would reside in 
the doctor or hospital that prepared the tissue or genetic information. 
This is an approach that accords with the treatment of medical records 
in Australia (Skene 1998: 27). 
Bennett and Bell, among others, have called this family-centered model 
communitarian and have responded by arguing that it is unnecessary 
because the current common and statute law allows encroachment on 
the rights of the autonomous individual in the extreme circumstances 
in which it is warranted. Instead, they prefer to rely on a notion of auton-
omy that encompasses one's relationship to others. Bennet and Bell 
suggest that the assumptions behind moves to communalize genetic 
information "rest on highly individualised and atomised notions of auton-
omy, which fail to rake account of the relational aspects of the exercise 
of autonomy" (Bennet and Bell2001: 158). They rely on Nedelsky's view 
that "autonomy is a capacity that exists only in the context of social rela-
tions that support it and only in conjunction with the internal sense of 
being autonomous" (Nedelsky 1989: 7). This conceptualization of rela-
tional autonomy offers a useful strategy for empowering the intercon-
nected individual of transgressive normativity. However, Bennett and 
Bell do not consider such a radical revision of autonomy as requiring 
amendment to existing legal structures. Instead we are asked to accept 
the existence of this form of autonomy and to find its accommodation 
within the legal structures currently in place. I argue, however, that this 
kind of accommodation is simply not possible because it challenges 
the very framework that the legal structure seeks to enforce. 
In contrast to Bennett and Bell, Ann Sommerville and Veronica English 
take communitarian theory as a way to modify liberal individualism 
in order to take into account the interconnectedness that genetics 
exposes. According to them: 
Jsa/Jel l(arpin 
h brought to the fore in the ·bTty to ot ers are . 1 d 
In'erconnecredness and responsl 1 1 n counter to current ethtca an h' ch seems to ru . ffi 
genetic sphere in a manner ~ t f ·ndividual rights and autonomy are msu -
legal orthodoxy. Extreme nottons o 1. woven interests. A more useful ~rame-
cl·ent to deal with these complex and mtefr my with a modified version of b. · otions o autono . · bl Wo rk is gained by com mtng n d . . made by one person mevtta y 
. h. h · ses ectstons · 
Communirarianrsm w tc recogm l h e r'tghts without also acceptmg 
· d' ·d cannot av 
affect others and that an tn tvt u(; erville and English 1999: 150) 
that he or she has certam duttes. omm .ll d 
H' relational autonomy and Somervl e an 
While Bennett and Be s . . . ificant attempts to grapple 
d·fi d mumtanamsm are stgn English's mo I e com . f selfhood neither is, in my 
bl f th transgressiVeness o ' with the pro em o e . h b ersive potential of transgressiv-
1 b th verswns t e su v 
view, adequate. n o d B ll' account the moments when 
l. d I Bennett an e s ' ity is not rea IZe . n d h's or her relation with others 
· d. ·d 1 must acce e to I 
an autonomous m lVl ua . h l lways make an exception. 
l ments for whlc aw can a . . . l are anoma ous mo b written to protect mdlVtdua 
l h wever laws must e In the norma course, o ' h "' d. 'duated" self. In Somerville 
l . f . n about t e m lVI rights to contro m ormano , . · kind of coherence 
. ' h . f mmunitanamsm, a certain 
and Enghsh s c mce o co . b d f sponsibility and connection. 
. h f · of nght on s o re is sought m t e ormatton d . ection when read through 
. h p· kler the move towar mterconn ' Just as w1t m ' " · h b' d " 
. . . d sire to create ttes t at m . 
a commumtanan tens, IS a e 'b h t ansgressive as antithetical ro 
· h lW:lzerdescn ester However, Mtc ae a . be a stable entity where 
. . . b se no commumty can 
commumtanantsro ecau d ·Interposition. In other h .b.lity of rupture an 
there is always t e possl I . . f even call them that, that will 
words, the kind of transgressLfons, I wet rianism are those that enable 
. bl . h c ntext o commum a be sustama e m t e o . . . d. 'duals rather than interpene-
. self-sustammg m lVI interconnection among . f h' that Walzer argues that 
. d' .d I It IS because o t IS 
tration among tn lVL ua s. . ly applied as a corrective 
a communitarian critique must be conunuous 
to the excesses of liberal individualism. He says: . 
b. d s there can be no such thmg as 
If the ties that bind us together do not m ~ ' . n'tsm is antithetical to trnns~ 
. . h. t ll commumtana · 
a community. If tt ts anyt mg a . a . h . al even to the liberal conn11Uillty 
gression. The transgredssive self t(~:f:~~ ~~~0: 14-15) 
which is its creator an sponsor. . . b l 'ch 
k' d of cornmunitanamsm a out w 11 
Here we see the limits of even the m h most marginalized in the r h .t Those w o are 
Sommerville and Eng IS wn e. h fi d hemselves least accommodated 
community are generally those w o n t 
Genetics and the Legal Conception of Self 203 
by the social, political, and econon1ic structures in place. They are seen 
as transgressive because they cannot meet the standards of selfhood 
in place. It is unlikely, therefore, that bonds of responsibility and duty 
can operate fairly to bind individuals who are struggling for a legitimate 
position within the community in the first place (discussed in the next 
section). Indeed, their insistence on membership in that community will 
itself be seen as disruptive. 
Unruly transgressive bodies threaten the stability of the community 
because those bodies do not abide by its limits. Nevertheless, finding 
ourselves necessarily connected with, dependent upon, and vulnerable 
to others is in fact the state in which we all exist. The only question is 
where power resides in these interconnected selves. It is the operation 
of power moving within these inevitable interconnections that needs to 
be regulated. 
In the next section I expose the transgressive body of the apparently 
autonomous individual through the use of legal discourses surrounding 
genetics. In particular, through some examples of failed attempts to reg-
ulate the use and disclosure of genetic information it becomes clear that 
an individuated and separate subject around which a cohort of legal 
rights and responsibilities are built is unsustainable. Rather than sup-
press that transgressivity, I argue we should embrace it as a starting point 
for dealing justly with people. We should give significant value to those 
identities that are not self-contained and independent but instead rely on 
a transgressive interconnectedness to sustain selfhood. 
The Genetic Privacy and Non-discrimination Bill of 1998 (Cth) was the 
first major attempt in Australia to pass national legislation specifically 
dealing with issues arising out of the genetic biotechnologies. Its primary 
aim was to protect the individual's privacy rights over their genetic infor-
mation and to prevent discrimination that might arise when information 
about genetic status is revealed. The bill failed to get the necessary support 
in Parliament, and the Australian Law Reform Commission, in conjunc-
tion with the Australian Human Ethics Committee, has now been charged 
with the role of reporting on the issues raised by the bill.' 
This bill attempted to create a regulatory regime that dealt with not 
only the collection, storage, and analysis of human DNA samples and 
the genetic information characterized from them, but also discrimination 
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The submission by the University of Sydney's Faculty of Medicine to 
the Senate Constitutional and Legal Issues Committee inquiry into the 
bill, pointed out, for instance, that an ambiguity arises when an individ-
ual's DNA is incorporated with a viral DNA. The point made in the sub-
mission is that the viral DNA actually becomes part of the individual's 
DNA, and the question that necessarily follows is whether the viral DNA 
is part of the individual (Leeder 1998) This is obviously of concern to 
research scientists who may want to conduct research and analysis of 
viral DNA intermingled with human DNA and to exploit that research 
for commercial gain. From a legal perspective, a determination of where 
the human begins and ends appears to be impossible. In this sense rather 
than, as Dolgin would have it, undermining individual autonomy, a rad-
ically transgressive understanding of human identity is necessary to ensure 
the autonomy of the connected individual involved. Obviously a person 
whose DNA is intermingled with viral DNA is still a person. If we take 
the geneticization of identity to its extreme, we will find ourselves 
inexorably defined out of existence unless a level of transgressivity is 
embraced. However, the law is not in the habit of accommodating infil-
tration by the other. 
How then does this most unreliable of individuated bodies, to refer back 
to Haraway's question, seek legal protection for its privacy and against 
discrimination? The law requires its subject to be stable, autonomous, 
self-sufficient, and independent, but the body as the law knows it is 
in fact a fabrication that mimics material fixity. Accordingly, legal 
responses to bodily transgressions are generally boundary policing, and 
a singular individual is artificially carved out through juridical force. 
This sometimes occurs literally on living bodies, as in the case of con-
joined twins, or through the sterilization of intellectually disabled girls 
(Shildrick 1999, Karpin, 1992, 1999). 
Here we are exploring how it occurs at the microlevel of genes. We see 
how the law and scientists struggle to find the viable individual. Yet another 
example of this struggle to identify exactly who or what is the rights-
hearing individual occurs, not surprisingly, in the section of the now 
defunct bill dealing with rights over the DNA of a fetus. Clause 24 reads: 
(I) Where genetic information is available from genetic analysis before the birth 
of a person about that person's genome, the genetic information is the genetic 
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' . . l mother but becomes the genetic inforrna-
information of the persons blolog~a is born alive. (Genetic Privacy and Non-
tion of that person when he or s e 
discrimination Bill 1998) . . . 
d. d lanse in the bill because Its cnt>cs . h s the most >spute c k Th>s was per ap h b . d'fference that genes ma e. 
. f '1 d nderstand t e astc ' 
claimed It al e to u h . hat l·s sometimes called a ges-
. h b' l . cal mot er IS w If, for mstance, t e 10 og> . . h fetus in her womb for the 
h t ·5 she 1s carrymg t e 
rational surrogate, t a 1 ' ld argue it is inappropriate 
d h then some wou ' genetically relate mot er, . , £ . . formation about the fetus 
'll . wnersh>p o genetic m for the b1 to g>ve 0 . . l h could be the recipient of 
. l the bwlog>ca mot er 
to her. Alternanve y, n thou h she is not genetically related to the 
a donor ovum, so that eve . g h h s the guardian of the fetus 
fetus, it is the inte~t of allhpartl~S t atlls ri~:Cs over the genetic informa-
and subsequent ch>ld, oug t to ave a 
tion pertaining thereto: . . . n their submission, further com-
The Australian MediCal Assocwnon, 1 . th bill's choice of the 
NA rshi when they questwn e 
plicate fetal D owne P . . . t of these rights. They sug-
. h th appropnate reClplen biolog>cal mot er as e . f DNA gene or chro-
. .d ·1y h!Ch component o ' 
gest "it is possible to I entl . w . l· therefore why should the 
. 1 and wh>ch 1s materna , 
mosome IS paterna l h 'b'ological mother"'? (Australian 
genetic information belong sole y to t e 1 
Medical Association 1998: 345). . . light of the legal conception of 
This medical response IS mterestmg m G /'· 
. . vel! examines the English case of Attorney- enera s 
the fetus. Knstm Sa 3 WLR 421) where a pregnant woman 
Reference (No.3 of 1994 ([1997] f t cht'ld who died shortly 
. h b' th 0 a prema ure 
was stabbed, causmg t e tr e u with a different 
f (S 11 2002) At each instance the court cam P . a ter ave . he first instance it had no existence 
conceptualization of the fetus. At t 1 . held to be part of tbc 
. l al to the court of appea , tt was . 
IU aw; on appe d . h ld to be an organism slit d . th House of Lor s tt was e . moth~r; an Lfi . e House of Lords decision is most interestJng. 
genertS. The bas>s of the . d the argument that the fetus 
L d Mustill and Lord Hope rejecte . 
Both or d Th first ground was the tact 
was a part of its mother on three groun fs.sha:ed genetic material lroll1 
h of a fetus cons1sts o 1 that t e genotype d was the fact that an embryo couk 
its mother and Its father. Th~ sec';'the third was the characterization of 
be created outs!de the worn ' an d her developing fetus as symbiotic. 
the relationship between a woman an 
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What is interesting is how the court used the genetic connection with 
both the father and the mother as a signifier of individuality and there-
fore separation, rather than considering these joint contributions as 
giving rise to an interconnection between the genetic progenitors and 
the fetus. 
It is clear from both the scientific and legal discourses discussed here 
that geneticization of identity is a kind of underpinning ideology, which 
means that those issues that would otherwise be determined by normal 
social arrangements are instead complicated and in some instances over-
ridden by a genetic claim. The interesting twist is that in this intense clas-
sificatory activity the autonomous individual is not so much fragmented 
but revealed as already grafted onto others. In other words, the process 
of geneticization reveals the very transgressivity of our selves at the same 
time as genetics is touted as offering the capacity to identify us in our 
very uniqueness. 
Having identified the ways in which genetics forces the recognition 
of a state of interconnection and interpenetration, I now go on to show 
how that interconnectivity cannot be neutralized through a legal or 
social regime that prioritizes a shared heritage, since this significantly 
underdescribes the complex interplay of power, expertise, and resource 
distribution in the context of genetic heritage. I show how there is a dan-
ger in looking to discourses of genetics as a way of describing intercon-
nection because at the same moment that connection is foregrounded, 
it is also territorialized and racialized. Without an understanding of the 
transgressive in the context of the communal there will be no means by 
which to realign the existing inequities and power claims. In the final 
part of this chapter I examine the proposal by various indigenous and 
environmental groups for a «genetic commons" to see if this radical recon-
ceptualization of the rights over and access to genetic information offers 
a partial solution. 
Many have argued that the Human Genome Project (HGP), which had 
as its goal the mapping and sequencing of "the" entire human genome, 
relates to everybody while in fact relating to nobody at all. As the HGP 
confined its sampling to largely white, northern populations and yet 
premised its usefulness on the creation of a generic genome, the Human 
Genome Diversity Project (HGDP) was conceived as a necessary correr•;"" 
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aimed at mapping ethnic diversity. The HGDP originally sought to col-
lect samples from a broader range of ethnic populations. However, the 
project quickly became focused, not on obtaining samples from all 
the world's populations, but on targeting particular populations that were 
on the verge of disappearing, and on preserving, not the populations, 
but the cell lines. In other words, where the HGP created an apparently 
generic human genome (but where generic means primarily white and 
northern European), the HGDP identified marginal genetic identity 
(the exotic other). In these two projects we see a tension between non-
territorial "human genome" and a racially specific "community genome." 
The former can only claim its normative generic status by presenting 
the specified identities in the HGDP as marginal, small, threatened 
outposts of the other that cannot endanger the normativity of the generic 
genome. 
This is why the decision by indigenous groups to object to the HGDP 
is so poignant. Indigenous groups represent the point of view of those 
whose bodily interconnection has been used as a means to subordinate 
them. In the context of the HGDP they are offered the opportunity 
to further negotiate the transgression of their bodies, while there is no 
recognition of the ways in which the most reliable western individuated 
bodies are never open to negotiation. The language of altruism, used in 
the context of discussions about the human genome as the common 
heritage of humanity, fails to take account of the myriad ways in which 
marginal bodies are already operating as common property. For instance, 
when the World Medical Association resolved that "the information 
[from the HGP] should be general property and should not be used for 
business purposes" (World Medical Association 1992), or when the 
guidelines to the HGDP describe its primary aim as "[u]ltimately, to cre-
ate a resource for the benefit of all humanity and for the scientific com-
munity worldwide" (International Planning Workshop 1993: 4), there is 
a fundamental failure to understand the unequal distribution of common 
resources worldwide and the way that inequality is mapped along race 
and gender lines. The harvesting of genes from indigenous people is to 
be compared, for instance, with the harvesting of the genetic information 
of the people of Iceland, which has become both a multimillion dollar joint 
venture between the government and two multinational corporations 
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(deCode Gen ( d R h 
I. e lCS an oc e Pharmaceuticals) and a debate b . a Ism and th 'd 1 . a out nation-
. e 1 eo ogy of raclal purity (see later discussion 
Yet Sclentlsts mvolved in the HGDP . ). 
when having offered a rl·gorou are, lt seems, genuinely perplexed 
s commttment to · f d liberal individual model) . . . . m orme consent (the 
Ill COUJUflCtion With a . 
to group cultural attributes, they are rebuffed b gen;rous sensitivity 
of would-be participants. Victoria Tauli-Cor uz yIn Igenous groups 
describes the difference ,·n und d. p ' an md!genous actlvlst, 
erstan mg: 
I was on a panel with Andre Langana a for . 
Human Genome Diversity Project (HGD; ~er committee member for the 
conference in Berne Switzerland H ) at t~e Patents, Genes and Butterflies" 
I presented my critiq~e of this pro:e t e ;a~ as ed to talk about the HGDP and 
understand what indigenous e J I c .h unng t~e open forum he said he couldn't 
in order to help others get :elol phes aveldaghamst the extraction of their blood 
h ' e wou ave no sec d h h e argued. (Tauli-Corpuz 2001: 252) on t aug ts about it, 
Andre Langanay's statement shows the importance of a co . 
to a Sltuated account of identity Wh.l L mmltment 
benign, Tauli-Corpuz views th . . '/ aganany sees the project as 
who knows all too well the p:~:;:c; c:~m the p~rspective of someone 
and control b d. · . omzmg orces to appropriate 
o Ies, terntones, resources, cultures and knowledg I h 
san:e way, the submission by the Aboriginal and Torres Strait el:la:~e e 
Soclal Justlce Commissioner Dr B.ll J r 
Reform Commission's . . ' . . I onas~ to the Australian Law 
highlights the context :~'::Tc~ntod~he protectwn of genetic information 
m Igenous Australians th · k b h 
extraction of genetic information from the' . . m a out t e Ir CitiZenry: 
As t~e most disadvantaged members of Australian s . . . 
Strait Islander peoples are . II 1 Ociety, Abongmal and Torres espec1a y vu nerable t I . . 
encounters with colonisers h b h o exp Oitatwn. Their past 
k ave een c aracter· d b h . nowledge, culture and the a t G . . Ise y t e stealmg of land 
r s. enetic mutations f d · d' ' 
are providing yet another rich field f I . . oun m Iscrete populations 
h . or exp ottatwn th' r· b . p armaceuttcal companies acting with the ex lici '. IS. I~e y trans-natiOnal 
or state governments. (Jonas 2002: 3). p tor Implicit support of national 
It is clear then, that one can n d 
on the h . f h o more a vocate an altruistic model premised 
s anng o w at · 1 d h . 
in which i d .. d I . h lS a rea y s ared genetic material, than a model 
The H~~;l ua ng ts over that shared material are enshrined. 
f . Model Eth1eal Protocol for Collecting DNA S 1 
or mstance, attempts to overcome these inequities by requirin:~boess~ 
collecting samples to obtain appropriate consents from the communities 
being sampled and to work in partnership with them (Human Genome 
Diversity Committee 1993: 18). At the same time, long-term storage of 
the information is contemplated that would enable general access to the 
scientific community, and the expertise to make use of that information 
resides squarely in the hands of that scientific community (Human 
Genome Diversity Committee 1993: 20, 29). The set of ethical issues 
enumerated in the Model Ethical Protocol indicates how researchers might 
return some of the benefit to the sampled population. Ethical issue no. 3, 
for example, states: 
Researchers should actively Seek ways in which participation in the HGD Project 
can bring benefits to the sampled individuals and their communities. Examples 
of such benefits include health screening, medical treatment or educational 
resources (Human Genome Diversity Committee 1993: 32). 
However, these gestures insist upon using a liberal individualist model 
of consent and profit. It is taken for granted that the means to achieve 
justice is through this model. 
An alternative model posited by Hilary Cunningham exposes the way 
in which the liberal individualist model fails. She describes her model 
as relational and rejects a model in which the scientist and the indigenous 
group operate as two separate negotiating identities. Instead she posits 
the following: 
I do not mean a traditional collaboration in which a project is designed and then 
implemented with the consultation of a research constituency. The collaboration 
which I mention here makes the scope, design, goals, methods of implementation 
and access to research results all negotiable items. Empirical researchers in pm·-
ticular, whose objectives and methods are said to be governed by acontextual 
laws and procedures will find this co1Jaboration particularly difficult since it chal-
lenges the very epistemological basis of scientific knowledge. Such collaboration 
suggests that just as valuable to any project's scientific objectives is the formation 
of a viable relationship with research subjects. This social hermeneutic indicates 
that the object of research is not simply "information" (a knowledge commodity 
that can be acquired and controlled by one party) but "insight," a relational kind 
of knowledge that can be developed only through negotiation of two engaged 
parties. (Cunningham 1998: 227-228) 
It is clear that what is being suggested here is more along the lines of 
my transgressive normativity model. The research subject is no longer 
kept at arms length but instead becomes both researcher and researched. 
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The boundaries b t h 
the . . e ween t e two, no longer strictly held, challen 
way m wh1ch western research is standard· d ge 
ohbjective. Cunningham recognizes the radicaln::: ofo~h;:'pp::~~~ny mhade 
s e says: w en 
Yet how many granting agencies-especiall in th . 
fund projects whose goals and m th d y e scJences-wouid be willing to 
the negotiation of research met~ ~ I ~ere so fundamentally contingent upon 
227-228) o o ogles and results? (Cunningham 1998: 
It is the power plays of interconnection that ar . 
example, the target of research is not a disenfranc~i~~~rat~onal when, for 
::~ :ng::u:o:ho, in rahcialized terms, identify themselv~: :;:~~~: :r:r;: 
g posit t e punty of their genetic I . . 
superiority. ram re£ . h . poo as an llldlcator of 
errmg to t e genetic data b f h . 
lation constructed by deC d . II b . ase o t e Icelandic popu-
o e m co a oratwn With R h Ph 
cals. In this case the subject f h oc e armaceuti-
through their g;vernment s o t e research-the Icelandic population 
which the research would ::t:eselntatlvAes-nebgotiated the terms under 
h H P ace. rgua ly the Icelandic t t e ealth Database Act of 1998 d h B" b s atutes, 
an t e JO anks Act f 2000 
sent a substantial governmental int . . o ' repre-
The opt-out form of consent altho ruhswn mto research methodologies. 
' ug not everyone's idea of £ · d 
appropriate method of obt . . h a air an 
aimng researc subjects w hi 
was explicitly legislated in both acts' Wh"l , as somet ng that 
whether the results and profit f . h I e controversy continues over 
f s rom t e research should b . h h o a private corporation the £ t . e m t e ands 
deCode under the legis! 't. . ace remams that the license provided to 
a JOn JS wr twelve ye 1 I I 
are not unconnected research sub ·ects b ars on y. c~ anders then, 
in which the research will p J d , duthhave had a say m the manner 
rocee an ave set 1fl I . . 
to ensure that some of the fi . I h. p ace prOVISions 
Iceland. nancla ac levements are funneled back into 
It is worth considering then why Iceland h b 
yet indigenous groups targeted by the HGDP ~ een able to d~ this and 
has characterized the d b d ave not. Skuh Slgurdsson 
e ate aroun the adva t f I l 
research population fo . n age o ce and as a 
r genetics as surrounded b th "" 
myths, cliches, fantastical tales about Iceland as; e mvocation of 
and regurgitated half-truths " H "d "fi h, p and present, pieties 
· e 1 enti es t e euge · f 
as having "hardly left d . bl" mc past o Iceland 
a ent In pu IC memory" (Sigurdsson 2001: 108). 
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r: is uite significant. Finnbogason, one of the most 
That past, howeve '. ~ 1 f the first half of the twentieth century, 
influential Icelandic mte ectua s ~, f the "purification of the 
d h " . of eugemcs to argue or 
invoke t e sctence . . . d h sical assets" (Palsson and 
Icelandic race to preserve Its sptntual an p y . ar biol-
Haroard6ttir 2002: 282). Einar Amason, professor of evolutwn y d 
. h University of Iceland, has rna e 
ogy and population genetiCS at t eat the deCode project has "evoked 
similar statements about the way th I 1 ders" (Amason, 1999) 
the myth of the homogen[e]ous Aryan ce an . that Iceland 
d h h llenged those claims with research suggestmg 
an as c a . · E pe (Amason is one of the most genetically heterogeneous nations m uro 
et al. 2000: F3 ). . . different kinds of interconnected 
What we are left With then !S two d (although 
. . Th I elandic community has to some egree commun~tle~ ~ cof an all too inadequate democratic governance) 
Wlthm dtt:at t~:np;wer plays over their interconnectivity do not _result m 
ensure . . d at undermme thetr power 
their exploitation. Here their connectivity. oeths en case of indigenous com-
. ff t ·t However m 
but instead gives e ec~ _o ~.. d b the requirement for individual 
munities, their connectivity rhs negate . y from western legal traditions 
· ed by researc ers commg 
consent lmpos . d" "d al These groups then find themselves h f h tonomous m !Vl u . ~i:~ ::e:i~;l;:o legal recourse for protection of their genetic informa-
tion as a group. 
Conclusion 
. . been to utilize genetic discourses to challenge 
My aim m this chapter has d individuated liberal self. I have done 
the stability of the autonomo~; a:bjects who are connected, vulnerable, 
this in order to opedn a :ace rot shed their dependencies in order ro 
and dependent an w o cann selfhood is 
become the liberal subject. These are the peoplhe whoske verys a base unit 
d h ning Once we ave ta en a 
then seen as unruly an t reate ffort will need to be directed to deter-
the interconnected self, regulatory e d 1 Th"s is in con-
. d . these interconnecte se ves. 1 
mining where power res! es m . , h" h while offering the 
11 f " netic commons w tc ' 
trast to the ca or a ge h ld ·n common to be used 
· d' as a resource e I 
genome and genetic tscourses f 1 1 s some further accounr 
equally by all people, will not be success u un es 
------
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is taken of the unequal society onto which such a commons must be 
mapped. The treaty initiative to share the "genetic commons" that was 
formally launched in February 2002 at the World Social Forum in Porto 
Alegre, Brazil, reveals this tension in its text, which states: 
Therefore, the nations of the world declare the Earth's gene pool, in all of its bio~ 
logical forms and manifestations, to be a global commons, to be protected and 
nurtured by all peoples and further declare that genes and the products they code 
for, in their natural, purified or synthesized form as well as chromosomes, cells, 
tissue, organs and organisms, included cloned, transgenic and chimeric organ~ 
isms, will not be allowed to be claimed as commercially negotiable generic infor~ 
marion or intellectual property by governments, commercial enterprises, other 
institutions or individuals. (Treaty to Share the Genetic Commons 2002: 6) 
However, in the explanatory material that accompanies the text, the 
authors say that the "Treaty must support the sovereignty of nations and 
of communities to exchange or withhold genetic materials they hold in 
trust .... We wish to affirm national sovereignty and community rights 
as well as the right of individuals whose genetic makeup is subject to dis-
crimination ... to have their own genetic integrity and rights ensured" 
(Treaty to Share the Genetic Commons 2002). 
It is this tension that I have been discussing throughout this chapter. How 
do we assert our autonomy over our genetic integrity yet recognize our 
inevitable interconnection with others? I argue that if we have an account 
of the self that is transgressive, that understands that we are both one and 
an other at once, we offer a self that is vulnerable to the interests and incur-
sions of others as well as being sensitive to them. The law must accommo-
date this newly dependent interconnected self. It is this that the authors of 
the treaty are trying to accomplish when they say: 
The Treaty to Share the Genetic Commons is designed to make every government 
and Indigenous Peoples a "caretaker" of their geographic part of the global 
genetic commons and to establish the appropriate statutory mechanisms to 
ensure both national sovereignty and open access to the flow of genetic informa-
tion. (Treaty to Share the Genetic Commons 2002: 2) 
In this statement we have an attempt to bring together the traditionally 
opposed positions of self-sufficiency and dependence. What I have been 
arguing is that the concept of the idealized individual of western liberal 
legalism is challenged by genetic discourses. However, rather than regard 
this as an assault, we should embrace the transgressivity of all selves. 
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d . d by a vulnerable In so doing, those traditionally 1sempowere . 
. d lfhood would find some recourse m the law. uncontame se 
Notes 
and 
. ' "Mimicry and Legendary Pyschaesthenia" 
1. Lac an cites Roger Callms s ~ss:y o has its origins in a process of deperson-
to explain how the formation o t e eg 1977) See also Meek's dtscusston of 
alization by assimilation to space (Lacan, . 
this point (Meek 1998). 
. . b owed from Shildrick (1997). . 
2. Thts term ts orr d" hich is a representation of bw-
. . d" . . h between a pe tgree, w . f. d" 3. Genettctsts rstmgms h" h. h med identified collectiOn o m t-d f mily w tc IS t e na , logical relatedness, an a a h ' k" h" elations with one another. d fi d . te ms oft etr ms tp r 
viduals e ne m r " e noted she felt closer to her sister and husband 
4. In one case, for example, Ev 1 h ousins" because they shared 
and her father but had also become c oser to er c 
"bTty to cancer 
a genetic susceptt 
1 1 
• . . h "I refer to use the concept of 
5 In Finkler's response to her cnttcs ~ _e n?tesb, ecaupse the Gramscian construct 
· · d of genetxctzatwn . . . hegemony of the gene mstea f h f dominant mstttunons h oncept o t e power o I 
of hegemony encompasses ~ e c h "t h1"ch permeates the social and cu ~ 
"d 1 b thetr very aut on Y w 
to impose an 1 eo ogy y h f f ce" (Finkler 2001: 257). 
. f d "1 l"f "thout t e use o or 
tural fabnc o at y I e, WI . . d h Australian Health Ethics 
. L R f Commtsswn an t e 6. The Australian aw e orm . . 66 'Protection of Human Committee released a final report, dtscusston paper ' 
. , · ' ·n August 2002. 
Genettc In, ormatzon, I f h d tabase but until they do so, 
. h . ht to opt out o t e a ' 
7. Icelanders were gtven t eng . Th" s further entrenched in the BioBanks 
they are presumed to have opted m. ~shwa public discussion (Sigurdsson, 
d · M 2000 wtt out any SD Act, which was passe m ay 1 19 697 citizens had opted out of the H 
2001). By the middle ofMarch}OO h' r~cess become entities in a second:ordcr 
and as Sigurdsson descnbes It, m t ~ p h as the first~order HSD IS still HSD, registering those socially devtant w ere 
empty" (2001: 113). 
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